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The judiciary created the act of state doctrine to permit courts to
refrain from questioning or making judgments upon the acts of a for-
eign sovereign.' This doctrine concerns the jurisdiction of United States
courts over the actions of a foreign state within its own territory.2 The
act of state doctrine is neither required by nor considered a source of
international law, rather it plays an important role in United States
domestic law.3 This role, rooted in the separation of powers theory, pro-
vides a basis for interaction between the executive, legislative, and judi-
cial branches in the sensitive realm of foreign relations.4
* J.D. Candidate, 1990, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428-29 (1964) (defin-
ing the purpose of the act of state doctrine as requiring a balance between the judicial
and executive branches of the government in making decisions on hearing cases which
may have an effect on foreign affairs); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250. 252
(1897) (defining the act of state doctrine as not allowing the judicial system of one
country to sit in judgment of the actions of another government, especially %%hen the
action is made within its own territory); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIG\ RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443 comment a (1986) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT FOREIGN RELATIONSI (relating the origins of the act of state doctrine as being
derived from both Underhill and Sabbatino and describing the basis of it as a theory of
judicial restraint).
2. See RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1, at § 443 comment a (cit-
ing Sabbatino and stating that the judicial branch should refrain from examining acts
of foreign governments within their own territory).
3. See Note, Commercial Activity as Applied to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act and the Act of State Doctrine. Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1015, 1021-22 (1984) (giving a broad overview and history of the act of state
doctrine).
4. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981). cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); see Buckley v. Valeo. 424 U.S. 1. 120 (1975) (discuss-
ing the separation of powers theory); Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421 (noting that the un-
derlying policy of the act of state doctrine is the separation of powers theory); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2-2 to 2-4 (1978) (defining the theory of
separation of powers as allowing each branch of government to perform its constitu-
tionally stated functions, thus preserving the independence and integrity of each
branch).
Various other theories are advanced as justifications for the act of state doctrine. See
Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 325, 327-28 &
nn.3-9 (citing several cases and commentaries advancing judicial prudence, deference,
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Initially a flexible concept, 5 the act of state doctrine gradually
evolved into one of the most criticized, misunderstood, and inconsis-
tently applied doctrines in United States jurisprudence." As a result of
such judicial confusion and uncertainty over this elusive standard,
courts have applied the act of state doctrine in a wide variety of cases
involving foreign sovereign actions.' For example, the Supreme Court
has traditionally limited the act of state doctrine to cases involving for-
eign expropriations.8 In recent years, however, courts have expanded its
use to situations other than expropriation cases.9 The result is inconsis-
tent decisions in factually similar cases; 10 some courts use the act of
state doctrine as a complete bar to adjudication," while other courts
create numerous exceptions to avoid it. 2
restraint, abstention, issue preclusion, conflict of laws, and choice of law); Chow, Re-
thinking the Act of State Doctrine: An Analysis in Terms of Jurisdiction to Prescribe,
62 WASH. L. REV. 397, 400 & nn. 8-10 (citing cases and commentaries basing the act
of state doctrine on theories of choice of law, judicial deference, separation of powers,
and political question).
5. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
6. See Bazyler, supra note 4, at 365-69 (demonstrating confusion and misconcep-
tion about the act of state doctrine); Chow, supra note 4, at 398-99 (citing several
examples of confusion and criticism of the act of state doctrine); Kirgis, Editorial
Comments, 82 Am. J. INT'L L. 58, 58 (1988) (arguing that even twenty years after the
Sabbatino decision, United States courts still misunderstand the effect of applying the
act of state doctrine).
7. See Bazyler, supra note 4, at 328-29 (discussing expansion of the application of
the act of state doctrine); see also Knight, International Debt and the Act of State
Doctrine: Judicial Abstention Reconsidered, 13 N.C.J. INT'L L. & Com. RuG. 35, 37
(1988) (suggesting a new standard for review of international debt repayment disputes
that are not traditional act of state expropriation cases).
8. See Banco Nacioan de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (recogniz-
ing the act of state doctrine in a Cuban expropriation case).
9. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (applying the act of
state doctrine for the first time in a suit for damages resulting from a foreign sover-
eign's assault and detention); Bazyler, supra note 4, at 344-73 (defining nonexpropria-
tion cases and the use of the act of state doctrine); Knight, supra note 7, at 37-38
(outlining the implementation of the act of state doctrine in nonexpropriation cases);
Comment, Foreign Corrupt Practices: Creating an Exception to the Act of State Doc-
trine, 34 Am. U.L. REV. 203, 211-13 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Foreign Corrupt
Practices] (discussing the use of the act of state doctrine in nonexpropriation cases).
10. See infra notes 83-121 and accompanying text (comparing circuit court treat-
ment and inconsistent application of the act of state doctrine).
II. See, e.g., Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d
404, 406 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984) (barring adjudication
through the use of the act of state doctrine in a foreign bribery case); Hunt v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977) (using the act of
state doctrine as a bar to adjudication in an antitrust case); see also Bazyler, supra
note 4, at 328 (noting that the courts invoke the act of state doctrine to avoid deciding
complicated international transaction cases).
12. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682
(1976) (creating the commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine); First
Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972) (discussing the
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The varied application of the act of state doctrine reveals the need
for the creation of a uniform standard. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'! v.
W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.'" attempts to create such a standard. In Envi-
ronmental Tectonics, the court declined to invoke the act of state doc-
trine because no proof existed that adjudication of the issue would in-
volve more than a simple inquiry into the motivations behind a foreign
sovereign's action. 4 The court held that judges should not invoke the
act of state doctrine based on mere speculation of judicial interference
in foreign affairs,' 5 particularly in private suits concerning violations of
federal regulatory laws. 6
This Casenote analyzes the decision of the Third Circuit in Environ-
mental Tectonics and suggests that it creates a proper and workable
standard. Part I describes the history and origin of the act of state
doctrine, with an emphasis on Supreme Court decisions, judicial excep-
tions to the doctrine, and recent lower federal courts' treatment. Part II
discusses Environmental Tectonics with an in-depth analysis of the
facts, procedural history, and the Third Circuit decision. Part III ex-
amines the author's analysis of the decision and explores the implica-
tions of Environmental Tectonics in future act of state doctrine cases.
Finally, the note concludes that the Third Circuit in Environmental
Tectonics, has set forth a clear standard which should allow courts to
make a reasoned and fair decision upon whether to invoke the act of
state doctrine in other than expropriation cases.
I. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE: HISTORY AND
ORIGIN
A. SUPREME COURT TREATMENT
During the past century, the United States Supreme Court and other
federal courts, have attempted to articulate a clear and precise defini-
tion for the act of state doctrine. The courts, however, have not been
Cuban government expropriation of United States branch banks): Bernstein v. N.V.
Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954)
(creating the Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine); see also Knight. supra
note 7, at 37 (arguing that some courts employ the act of state doctrine as a bar to
review and others do not).
13. 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988).
14. id. at 1061.
15. Id. The court found that there must be more than mere speculation of judicial
interference; there must be demonstrable proof. Id.
16. Id.
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successful. 7 Examination of the Supreme Court's treatment of the act
of state doctrine supports this conclusion.
The Supreme Court first articulated the act of state doctrine in Un-
derhill v. Hernandez.' In Underhill,'9 Chief Justice Fuller espoused
what is considered the "classic American statement"2 0 regarding the
act of state doctrine:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sover-
eign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances
by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of
by sovereign powers as between themselves.2"
Courts widely accept this broad statement and quote it in nearly every
case following Underhill as the underlying principle of the act of state
doctrine."2
In the years following Underhill the act of state doctrine developed
slowly because the courts tended to consider it judicially restrictive.23
The Supreme Court only employed the act of state doctrine in a limited
17. Bazyler. supra note 4, at 330-62.
18. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). The Court, however, stated
that the doctrine has roots dating back to the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries. Id., see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964)
(citing a seventeenth century English as an original source of the act of state doctrine
along with several late eighteenth and early nineteenth century United States cases)
(citing Blad r. Banifield, 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Ch. 1674); see also, Bazyler. supra note 4,
at 330-32 (discussing the history and origins of the act of state doctrine): Chow, supra
note 4. at 404 & nn.35-36 (discussing original sources of the act of state doctrine);
Knight, supra note 7. at 39 (discussing early act of state doctrine cases).
19. Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252. Underhill, a United States citizen, sought damages
for assault and detention when revolutionary forces took over the Venezuelan govern-
ment in the 1892 revolution. Id. at 251. Underhill claimed that General Hernandez,
the revolution's military commander, did not permit him to leave Venezuela, and upon
his return to the United States Underhill initiated suit against Hernandez. Id. The
Supreme Court held that Hernandez acted within the scope of his sovereign capacity
and barred adjudication of the claim. Id. at 254.
20. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 416 (creating the "classic American statement" of
the act of state doctrine).
21. Underhill. 168 U.S. at 252.
22. See infra notes 18-113 and accompanying text (discussing various cases involv-
ing the act of state doctrine); Bazyler, supra note 4, at 332 (noting that the "Classic
American Statement" is repeated in many act of state doctrine cases); Chow, supra
note 4, at 405 (quoting the "Classic American Statement" of the act of state doctrine).
23. RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note I, at § 443 comment a. Courts
apply the act of state doctrine based on several different theories. Note, Republic of
Philippines v. Marcos: The Ninth Circuit Allows a Former Ruler to Invoke the Act of
State Doctrine Against a Resisting Sovereign, 38 Am. U.L. REV. 225, 231 (1988)
[hereinafter Note, Republic of Philippines v. Marcos]. These theories include the con-
flict of laws theory, the theory of judicial deference to the executive branch, and the
theory of international comity. Id. at 231-34 & nn.30-51.
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number of cases. 24 For example, in American Banana Co. 1'. United
Fruit Co. 25 the Court chose not to apply United States antitrust laws
extraterritorially.26 The Court held that because the antitrust action in
question was lawful in Costa Rica, the United States courts should re-
frain from deciding the case out of concern of interfering with the exec-
utive branch's foreign relations powers.27
This desire to avoid judicial intrusion was particularly acute for acts
committed within a foreign state's own territory,28 as in OetlJen v. Cen-
tral Leather Co.29 and Ricaud v. American Metal Co."0 In both cases
the Court again refrained from making decisions on act of state
grounds. Instead, the Court reaffirmed Underhill, failed to articulate a
clear definition, and declined to demonstrate the scope of the act of
state doctrine.31 The Supreme Court employed the same technical ex-
pressions to articulate various reasons for abstention, causing confusion
and uncertainty over the definition of the doctrine.3 2
Following the decisions in Oetjen and Ricaud in 1918, the Supreme
Court did not actively utilize the act of state doctrine for nearly fifty
years . 3 The Court did not revive the act of state doctrine until 1964, in
24. See, e.g., Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918) (invoking the
act of state doctrine in conjunction with the decision in Oeijen v. Central Leather Co.);
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) (barring adjudication because of
the act of state doctrine, the theories of international comity, and choice of law):
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (invoking the act of
state doctrine as a bar to adjudication based upon a theory that the la%% of a country
determines whether an act within that country is lawful).
25. American Banana Co. v. United States, 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
26. Id. at 359.
27. Id.
28. Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 303; Ricaud. 246 U.S. at 309.
29. Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 297. This case applies the act of state doctrine in a dispute
over the ownership of seized goods in possession of the revolutionary Mexican govern-
ment. Id. at 303.
30. Ricaud, 246 U.S. at 304. The court determined that the courts of one country
will not judge another country's actions committed within its own territory. Id. at 309.
31. See id. at 309 (demonstrating that the Court employed the act of state doctrine
in order to avoid an international dispute between the United States and the new Mexi-
can government); Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 303 (revealing a similar purpose).
32. See Bazyler, supra note 4, at 334 (stating that the Supreme Court has used the
act of state doctrine to abstain from hearing cases to provide personal immunity to
foreign government officials, preserve territorial choice of law, and avoid international
conflict), see also, Note, Republic of Philippines v. Afarcos, supra note 23. at 231-34
(outlining various theories and rationales underlying the act of state doctrine).
33. See Bazyler, supra note 4, at 334 & n.48 (discussing that during the period
from 1918 to 1964, the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity emerged as the doctrine
of choice to avoid deciding international transaction cases). The Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act (FSIA) differs from the act of state doctrine because its protection is
based on the defendant's status as a foreign sovereign, while the act of state doctrine
applies based on the governmental character of the action even when no foreign sover-
eign is a party to the action. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 28 U.S.C. §§
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Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.34 Sabbatino provides the princi-
pal contemporary formulation of the act of state doctrine.?
In Sabbatino, a dispute arose when the Cuban government expropri-
ated the assets and interests of an American corporation.36 The issue
before the Court was whether the act of state doctrine applies when a
foreign sovereign state expropriates American assets or interests, and
such action does not serve a public purpose, discriminates against
United States citizens who own property in Cuba, fails to provide just
compensation, and is a blatant violation of international law.3 7 The Su-
preme Court rejected the lower court's decision to ignore the act of
state doctrine whenever a foreign state's act violates international
law,3 8 finding that no need existed for such an "inflexible and all-en-
compassing rule ' 39 because expropriation situations frequently involve
violations of international law. Rather, the Court intimated that courts
could make independent decisions by balancing all the factors
involved.40
1602-1611 (1982 & West Supp. 1989); see also RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS,
supra note I, at § 443 reporter's note II (noting that the Supreme Court did not
decide any important act of state cases between 1918 and 1964); see, e.g., United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 327-28 (1937) (precluding a decision on Soviet expro-
priation on the basis of the Underhill decision and the belief that United States courts
should refrain from making decions in cases that may have an impact on foreign rela-
tions); Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468, 471 (1937) (precluding a decision on Mexican
expropriation on the basis of the Underhill decision and also relying on the Oetjen and
Ricaud decisions).
34. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
35. RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1, at § 443 comment b (1986).
36. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 401-06. The Cuban government expropriated the assets
and interests of an American-owned Cuban sugar company (CAV) in response to a
congressional enactment that reduced the Cuban sugar quota. Id. at 401. The United
States commodity-broker, Farr Witlock, had a sales agreement to purchase sugar from
CAV where Farr would pay for the sugar upon arrival. Id. Upon delivery, Farr took
possession of the sugar but refused to pay the Cuban National Bank, claiming it had
an agreement with CAV. Id. at 405-06. Banco Nacional de Cuba received an order
from the New York Supreme Court appointing Sabbatino as a temporary receiver and
transferring all funds to him. Id. at 406. Banco Nacional then filed suit in Federal
District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover the money. Id.
37. Id. at 406-08.
38. Id. at 427-28.
39. Id. at 428. Chief Justice Harlan stated:
[Tihat the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property
within is own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized
by this country at the time of the suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unam-
biguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint
alleges that the taking violates customary international law.
Id.
40. Id. In balancing the interests of the parties, the executive and the judicial
branches, the Court discussed a number of factors to determine whether judicial review
of an act of a foreign sovereign is proper. Id. at 423-24; see also infra notes 45-46 and
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To arrive at this balancing test, the Court first discussed the "consti-
tutional underpinnings" of the act of state doctrine,-" which essentially
comprise the same elements as the separation of powers theory."2 The
Court stated that judicial decisions regarding foreign sovereign acts
should not interfere with executive branch foreign affairs powers."a The
Court, however, decided against a theory of strict judicial abstention,
finding it unnecessary to invoke the act of state doctrine simply to pro-
tect against judicial interference in executive affairs." Instead, the
Court articulated a case-by-case balancing test that weighs the degree
of codification in the area of international law'0 against the possible
repercussions on United States foreign relations with the foreign sover-
eign involved in the dispute.' 6 Applying this test to the facts in Sabba-
tino, the Supreme Court concluded that the act of state doctrine served
as a bar to adjudication.'
7
Although the Sabbatino holding appears narrow and limited to ex-
propriations cases, many lower courts have interpreted the language ex-
pansively.' 8 In the years following the Sabbatino decision, the Supreme
accompanying text (outlining factors involved in the balancing test).
41. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423-25. The Court emphasized that in a separation of
powers system, the relationship between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches
practically requires the existence of the act of state doctrine. Id.
42. id.
43. Id.; see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-13 (1962) (recognizing that courts
should refrain from interfering in questions of foreign relations): Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (stating that the United States Constitution
commits foreign policy issues to the executive and legislative branches): Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that in the area of
foreign affairs the United States government should present a unified front): see also
Note, Republic of Phillipines v. Marcos, supra, note 23, at 225 n.2 (advancing the
theory that United States courts should not interfere with executive branch unity in
areas of foreign policy and citing with approval Moore, Federalism and Foreign Na-
tions, 1965 DUKE L.J. 248, 273-74 for the proposition that the power of a single voice
in executive branch foreign affairs is important).
The doctrine of separation of powers is inherent throughout the Constitution. which
specifies the role of each branch of the government. U.S. CoNsr. arts. 1-111. The judi-
cial branch may hear cases that arise under the United States Constitution. United
States laws and treaties, and controversies that arise between states, citizens, and for-
eign nations. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2.
44. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (stating
that the need for political branch exclusivity may vary with the degree of an issue's
sensitivity).
45. See id. (holding that application of a sound principle of international law is
more reasonable and more firmly within the scope of judicial duties).
46. See id. (deciding on less important foreign relation issues may be within the
scope of the judiciary's duties). Courts have narrowed the focus of the Sabbatino test,
concentrating mainly on the act's legality, the foreign sovereign's political status, and
the implications that adjudication would have upon United States foreign affairs. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Note, Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, supra note 23, at 233-34 & n.48
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Court has rendered only two important act of state decisions.49 In First
National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,50 a case dealing with
the Cuban expropriation of the assets and the interests of Citibank's
Cuban branch office, the Court held that the act of state doctrine did
not preclude a decision on the merits. 51 Similarly, in Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,52 the Supreme Court held that the
act of state doctrine did not protect the Cuban expropriation of five
cigar manufacturing companies because the sovereign act was purely
commercial in nature. 53 Thus, instead of strictly following the Sabba-
tino standard, the Court began to create exceptions to the act of state
doctrine,54 establishing a precedent for wider and further reaching
(citing Note, Alien Tort Claims Act, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 433, 438-39 (1987) for the
proposition that the application of the act of state doctrine is unclear in certain factual
circumstances and also citing Note, Rehabilitation and Exoneration of the Act of
State Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 599, 611 (1980) for the proposition that
the Sabbatino "three factor" balancing test is of limited practical use). Several lower
courts have attempted to employ the Sabbatino test in other than expropriation cases.
See, e.g., Republic of Phillipines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted,
832 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1987) (involving the refusal to freeze assets of the former
Phillipine President at the request of the Phillipine government); Clayco Petroleum
Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 406 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1040 (1984) (relating to bribery of a foreign sovereign official); Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163
(1982) (dealing with an extraterritorial antitrust case); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Con-
goleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1296 (3d Cir. 1979) (involving both an antitrust and
conspiracy action); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 610-1 I
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985) (discussing conspiracy in the con-
text of the act of state doctrine).
49. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); First
Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
50. First Nat'l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 759.
51. Id. at 768-70; see also infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (discussing the
counterclaim exception to the act of state doctrine).
52. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 682.
53. Id. at 695; see also infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text (discussing the
commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine).
54. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which lower fed-
eral courts have not employed the Sabbatino guidelines). The judiciary was not the
only branch disenchanted with the Sabbatino standard. R. FALK, THE AFTERMATH OF
Sabbatino 35-52 (1965) (discussing congressional dislike of the Sabbatino decision).
Congress was unhappy with the Sabbatino decision because Fidel Castro and the revo-
lutionary government took advantage of American citizens. Note, Republic of Philip-
pines v. Marcos, supra note 23, at 234 & n.51 (asserting congressional disappointment
with the Sabbatino decision and citing with approval R. FALK, supra for the same
proposition).
Thus, in late 1964, Congress enacted the Hickenlooper Amendment. Hickenlooper
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat.
1013 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982)). Congress designed the
amendment to require a court to apply standards and principles of international law
when deciding on the merits of foreign sovereign expropriation cases, such as Sabba-
tino, unless, for foreign policy reasons, the executive branch intervenes. Knight, supra
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interpretation. 5
B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
Even prior to the Supreme Court's departure from its holding in
Sabbatino, the lower federal courts and Congress started to create ex-
ceptions to the act of state doctrine. This section will highlight the ex-
ceptions that the Third Circuit considered in Environmental Tectonics
Corp. Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co."'
I. The Bernstein Exception
In Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-
Maatschappij,57 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit created
note 7, at 44; Note, Foreign Corrupt Practices. supra note 9, at 210 & n.48: see 110
CONG. REC. 19,555, 19,557-60 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Hickenlooper) (commenting
on the Congressional desire to overturn the Sabbatino decision through an amendment
to the Foreign Assistance Act), see also S. REP. No. 1188. 88th Cong.. 2d Sess. 24.
reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3829, 3852 (discussing the
drafter's intention of the amendment to reverse, in part, the presumption or interfer-
ence in executive branch foreign relations created under Sabbatino in expropriation
cases). The amendment seems to give deference to the executive branch with respect to
judicially created law and further complicates the separation of powers problems dis-
cussed in Sabbatino; Knight, supra note 7, at 44 (evaluating and providing an excellent
analysis of the Hickenlooper Amendment). The admendment allows the executive
branch to intervene in any case before a court that it feels the court should not decide
on act of state grounds. Id.
The Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)
(2) (1982) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall
decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determina-
tion on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in
which a claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any party includ-
ing a foreign state (or a party claiming through such state) based upon (or
traced through) a confiscation or other taking after January I. 1959. by an act of
state in violation of the principles of international law, including principles of
compensation and other standards set out in this subsection: Provided, this sub-
paragraph shall not be applicable (I) in any case in which an act of a foreign
state is not contrary to international law . . . or (2) in any case wvith respect to
which the President determines that application of the act of state doctrine is
required in that particular case by foreign policy interests of the United States
and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court.
Id.
55. See J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYS-
TEM 402 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter SWEENEY] (stating that various Supreme Court
Justices in writing minority opinions have made efforts to limit the scope of act of
state); Bazyler, supra note 4, at 338-44 (reviewing conflicting theories regarding the
exceptions to the act of state doctrine); Chow. supra note 4, at 421 (discussing various
exceptions to the act of state doctrine), Knight, supra note 7. at 44-52 (discussing the
exceptions to the act of state doctrine).
56. 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988).
57. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). The original case involved a multitude of claims
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the Bernstein exception." The court allowed the executive branch to
submit opinions to the judiciary concerning its foreign affairs policyY9
Under the Bernstein exception, United States courts should only apply
the act of state doctrine when the State Department has announced
that adjudication of a foreign sovereign's act will in any way interfere
with executive branch foreign affairs."
The Supreme Court has never expressly acceded to the Bernstein ex-
ception. In Sabbatino, the Court explicitly stated that the act of state
doctrine should not exclusively depend on either the judicial or execu-
tive branch. 6' The Court in First National City Bank declined to rely
on a Bernstein letter from the State Department and allowed adjudica-
tion on the merits of a Cuban expropriation." Similarly, in Dunhill,
when the State Department again offered its opinion in a Bernstein
letter, the Court instead recognized the commercial activity exception
as binding.63 Thus, while refusing to expressly endorse the Bernstein
exception, the Court has attempted to determine when to employ the
act of state doctrine with the assistance of the State Department's in-
terpretation of the executive branch opinion."
that Arnold Bernstein, a German Jew, brought against the Nazi government of Ger-
many for property takings during World War Ii. Berstein v. Nederlandsche-Ameri-
kaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 173 F.2d 71, 72 (2d Cir. 1949). On appeal, the
Second Circuit directed a decision upon the merits of the case after receiving a letter
from the State Department stating that United States courts should decide upon cases
questioning the validity of acts of the Nazi government of Germany. Bernstein, 210
F.2d at 376.
58. See RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note i, at § 443 reporters note
8 (relating the history of the Bernstein exception).
59. Bernstein, 210 F.2d at 380.
60. See id. (quoting the Bernstein letter that specifically expressed the executive
branch's opinion on the need to adjudicate cases involving Nazi confiscations).
61. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 420, 436 (1964) (stating
that the Court would not rule on the validity of Bernstein). See RESTATEMENT FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS, supra note I, at § 443 note 8 (discussing Supreme Court treatment
of the Bernstein exception).
62. First Nat7 City Bank, 406 U.S. at 776-77 (1964). Three Justices preferred the
Bernstein exception, while six did not. Id. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and
Rehnquist agreed that courts should defer to executive approval whenever questioning
the act of state doctrine. Id. Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun, re-
fused to accept the exception. Id. In his dissent, Justice Brennan noted that the execu-
tive branch is often without sufficient facts and information to even make an educated
guess on the adjudication's impact on foreign affairs. Id. at 790-93.
63. See Alfred Dunhill of London Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695
(1976) (rejecting the Bernstein exception and promulgating the commercial activity
exception to the act of state doctrine).
64. See RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1, at § 443 reporter's note
8 (discussing the Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine); Bazyler, supra note
4, at 368-70 (stating that the Supreme Court has never adopted the Bernstein excep-
tion and arguing that the State Department is reluctant to issue such letters because of
the Court's failure to rely upon them). The State Department receives only two or
[VOL. 5:133
ENVIRONMENTAL TECTONICS
2. The Counterclaim Exception
In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court created the possibility of a coun-
terclaim exception to the act of state doctrine.69 It was not until First
National City Bank v. Banco Nacional De Cuba, however, that the
Court officially recognized the exception.6" The Court held that if a
foreign state filed a counterclaim in response to a suit brought in a
United States court, the foreign state had waived its right to use the
act of state as a defense to the original claim.6
7
The counterclaim exception originated as a result of the Court's frac-
tured opinion.68 Because the Court could not reach a plurality, its de-
sire to avoid the act of state bar to adjudication and decide the merits
of the case resulted in a new exception. 9 The Supreme Court's multi-
faceted opinion and its hesitance to expressly articulate the exception in
its First National City Bank opinion, however, has caused the lower
courts to promulgate conflicting interpretations and applications.
0
three requests for such letters annually and prior to 1986, has issued only seven such
letters. Id. at 370 n.274.
65. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 439. Justice Harlan stated in dictum that "[since the
act of state doctrine proscribes a challenge to the validity of the Cuban expropriation
decree in this case, any counterclaim based on asserted invalidity must fail." Id.
66. First Nat7 City Bank, 406 U.S. at 768-70.
67. Id. After the Cuban Revolution, the Castro government nationalized all the
banks in Cuba, including Citibank branches. Id. Citibank, having accepted collateral
from the predecessor to Banco Nacional to guarantee a loan to the previous govern-
ment, sold the collateral and kept the excess money as payment toward the loan. Id. at
760. Banco Nacional sued Citibank to recover the excess money; Citibank counter-
claimed and requested that the Court consider the excess money as damages for the
expropriation of its branch banks in Cuba. Id. at 760-61. The Court held that Banco
Nacional could not use the act of state doctrine as a defense to Citibank's counterclaim
because they had waived immunity by bringing the original suit. Id. at 759-61, 766-73.
68. Id. at 764-70. Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion, with Justices Douglas and
Powell each writing a separate concurrence. Id. Justice Rehnquist based his opinion on
the flexibility of the act of state doctrine derived from Sabbatino and found that the
State Department's Bernstein letter was persuasive. Id. Justice Douglas based his con-
curring opinion on an analogy to the theory of Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act's coun-
terclaim exemption. Id. at 772-73. Justice Powell concurred on the theory that unless
actual proof of interference with executive branch foreign policy existed, the courts
should decide upon such cases. Id. at 775; see Bazyler, supra note 4, at 338-41 (analyz-
ing the First Nat7 City Bank decision); Knight, supra note 7, at 45-46 (discussing the
First Nat7 City Bank decision and the individual opinions of the Supreme Court
Justices).
69. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 759-75
(1964) (confining the courts to adjudication of the case before them and leaving to the
executive branch the conduct of foreign relations).
70. See Bazyler, supra note 4, at 341 (arguing that the First Nat City Bank deci-
sion fostered confusion in the federal courts); Knight, supra note 7, at 47 n.56 (point-
ing out that in 1981, six Second Circuit cases involving similar Cuban expropriations
and the counterclaim exception resulted in erratic and dissimilar holdings).
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3. The Commercial Activity Exception
The Supreme Court developed the commercial activity exception to
the act of state doctrine in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic
of Cuba.7' The Court held that if a foreign sovereign state engages in
any activity that is completely commercial in nature,72 the act of state
doctrine will not apply so that the court can decide the case on the
merits. 73 The Court derived this exception from the theory of the com-
mercial exception for foreign sovereign immunity. 4 The commercial
activity exception narrows the scope of the doctrine and creates further
uncertainty and misunderstanding in its application. 7 The Supreme
Court only exacerbated the confusion by leaving the interpretation of a
"pure commercial activity" to the lower courts.76 Thus, although the
courts widely use the exception, it does not rest on a completely solid
foundation. 7
4. Analysis of The Exceptions
These exceptions illustrate the difficulties that the courts have exper-
ienced in applying and interpreting the act of state doctrine because no
71. 425 U.S. 682 (1976). The Cuban government expropriated the assets and inter-
ests of live cigar companies and appointed "'interventors" to run the companies. Id. at
685. The original owners of the companies (Cubans now in the United States) brought
suit against importers of the cigars, including the Alfred Dunhill of London Corpora-
tion. Id. Dunhill then brought suit against the interventors for reimbursement of the
amount that the company owed to the original owners but mistakenly paid to the in-
terventors. Id. The Court held that the interventors failed to prove that their actions
fell within the act of state doctrine. Id. at 694.
72. Id. at 696. When a nation enters the marketplace seeking customers, it divests
itself of its sovereign qualities. Id. (citing Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 369
(1934)).
73. Id. The Supreme Court decided to ignore the Bernstein exception, another pos-
sible device for avoiding the act of state bar to adjudication, and instead chose to create
a new exception to the doctrine. Id. at 698. In fact, in its Bernstein letter, the State
Department urged the Court to overrule Sabbatino and abolish the act of state doctrine
altogether. Id. at 685-86.
74. See Knight, supra note 7, at 47-50 (equating the commercial activity exception
to the act of state doctrine with the commercial activity exemption under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act and discussing the improper application of the exception
with respect to the act of state doctrine cases).
75. See Bazyler, supra note 4, at 370 nn.280-82 (discussing the general disagree-
ment. even within the Supreme Court, over the commercial exception to the act of state
doctrine); Chow, supra note 4, at 420 n.150 (discussing the effect that conflicting inter-
pretations of the commercial activity exception have had upon decisions in lower fed-
eral courts).
76. See Bazyler, supra note 4, at 370-71 (addressing the differing decisions of the
federal circuits).
77. Id. at 370.
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strictly defined parameters of either it or its exceptions exist. 78 Conse-
quently, enormous confusion and inconsistency prevails in federal cir-
cuit court decisions. The Supreme Court's reluctance to hear, and,
thus, clarify the limits of the act of state cases since Dunhill confirms
this conclusion.78
C. RECENT FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT TREATMENT
Over the past decade, the federal circuit courts have adjudicated a
large number of act of state cases.80 These courts have relied upon the
leading Supreme Court cases and exceptions to the act of state doctrine
in promulgating their decisions. 81 Although the Supreme Court tradi-
tionally has dealt with the act of state doctrine in the context of foreign
expropriations,82 the federal circuit court decisions have expanded the
application of the act of state doctrine.8 3 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third and Ninth Circuits have rendered influential act
of state doctrine decisions, several of which are highlighted by the
Third Circuit in Environmental Tectonics. This section will discuss the
leading federal circuit court cases relied on in Environmental Tecton-
ics, with an emphasis on Third Circuit and-Ninth Circuit act of state
doctrine case law because decisions in these circuits directly conflict.
I. Ninth Circuit Decisions
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Sav-
ings Ass'n84 is the Ninth Circuit's first interpretation of the modern act
78. See Bazyler, supra note 4, at 374-75 (concluding that the numerous exceptions
to the act of state doctrine foster not only confusion, but disagreement among courts):
Knight, supra note 7, at 52 (citing the confusion the act of state doctrin%. and its excep-
tions create).
79. See Chow, supra note 4, at 420-21 (noting the lack of Supreme Court decisions
on this issue).
80. SWEENEY, supra note 55, at 402, 408. Over the last thirteen years the Su-
preme Court has not made any significant act of state decisions and. therefore, has not
reviewed the decisions of the lower circuit courts. Id.
81. See supra notes 56-79 and accompanying text (discussing leading Supreme
Court cases and treatment of the exceptions to the act of state doctrine).
82. See Bazyler, supra note 4, at 344-49 (citing chronologically: Oetjen; Ricaud:
Sabbatzino: Citibank and Dunhill as the leading Supreme Court cases dealing %%ith the
act of state doctrine in the context of foreign expropriations).
83. See supra note 48 (illustrating how the federal circuit courts may invoke the
act of state doctrine in any claim involving events outside the United States).
84. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984). cert de-
iied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985). Timberlane accused the Bank of America of conspiring
with the Honduran government to destroy Timberlane's business opportunities in Hon-
duras. Id. at 1068. The Bank of America attempted to invoke the act of state doctrine
as a defense, intending to bar the court from hearing the case. hI
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of state doctrine. 85 The court adopted a flexible position in examining
the question of whether the actions of the Bank of America in conspir-
ing with the Honduran government to cripple Timberlane's business in-
terests in Honduras, was an act of state and, thus, barred by the doc-
trine.86 In formulating its opinion, the court discussed several important
factors.8" The court found that the act of state doctrine did not apply
because the transaction was essentially one between private parties that
specifically implicated only the Bank of America rather than either the
Honduran government or any Honduran officials.88 The court, then, de-
cided that because its involvement would not interfere with or threaten
the executive's foreign relations powers, 89 and because of the impor-
tance of extraterritorial enforcement of United States laws, it could ad-
judicate on the merits. 90
In 1981, however, the Ninth Circuit, in International Ass'n of Ma-
chinists v. OPEC 91 set forth a more detailed and rigid standard for the
act of state doctrine.9" In deciding whether petroleum price setting
agreements were a violation of United States antitrust laws, the court
expanded the scope of the act of state doctrine.93 The OPEC court af-
firmed the district court's dismissal, 9 but instead of basing its decision
on a theory of sovereign immunity, the court applied the act of state
doctrine and set forth a number of factors.95 The Ninth Circuit's adop-
tion of a broad interpretation of the act of state doctrine created a
85. See Bazyler, supra note 4, at 348-49 (noting that Timberlane is the leading
Ninth Circuit case in this area).
86. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 601; see Bazyler, supra note 4, at 349 (defining the
Ninth Circuit's Timberlane decision as a flexible interpretation of the act of state
doctrine).
87. Id. at 615. The Ninth Circuit considered the effect on United States foreign
commerce activities, the magnitude of the violation, and international comity and fair-
ness. Id.
88. Id. at 608.
89. Id. Although the Bank of America was inextricably involved with the Hondu-
ran government, a court could not characterize this involvement as the act of a foreign
sovereign. Id.
90. Id.
91. 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
92. Id. at 1358-61.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1362.
95. Id. at 1358-62. These factors include: whether a potential for judicial interfer-
ence in executive foreign policy decisions exists; whether the act is a violation of inter-
national law, or at least of the law of the countries involved; whether public interest in
the act exists, and whether the suit involves a sovereign's inherent right to protect its
people; see Bazyler, supra note 4, at 353-55 (analyzing the relevant factors and the
effect of the OPEC decision); Chow, supra note 4, at 422-23 (analyzing and explaining
the OPEC decision and arguing that on the basis of the OPEC decision United States
courts could not hear any cases involving possible actions of foreign sovereigns).
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standard that would possibly allow a foreign sovereign immunity in al-
most any situation and preclude United States courts from hearing al-
most any international dispute. 6
Therefore, when faced with Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp.,9" the Ninth Circuit refrained from deciding upon the
merits of the case even though the facts did not meet the threshold
requirements necessary to invoke the act of state doctrine as set forth
in OPEC.8 The court held that a government is acting in its sovereign
capacity, as well as in the best interest of its people, when it awards an
oil concession; thus, the court invoked the act of state doctrine." 9 The
court refused to accept the commercial exception because it recognized
that previous decisions within the circuit disagreed with the excep-
tion.100 The court, therefore, held that the existence of a commercial
activity does not automatically create an exception to the act of state
doctrine.' The court based this broad interpretation of the act of state
doctrine on a theory of judicial restraint. 0 2
2. Third Circuit Case Law
The leading Third Circuit case is Manninglon Mills, Inc. v. Con-
goleum Corp.."° Refusing to apply the act of state doctrine in an anti-
96. See Bazyler, supra note 4, at 354-55 (analyzing the OPEC case with respect
to the interaction of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the act of state
doctrine).
97. Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984). In a dispute between tmo United States
corporations, Clayco Petroleum Corporation (Clayco) alleged that Occidental Petro-
leum Corporation (Occidental) obtained a valuable oil concession from the Arab Sover-
eignty, Umm Al Qaywayn, through the bribery of government officials. Id. at 405.
When the SEC determined that improprieties occurred in an action for violation of the
disclosure provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act, Clayco brought suit under
both the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts. Id. at 406. Occidental argued that the
act of state doctrine precluded the court from hearing the case. Id.: see also infra notes
143-48 and accompanying text (analyzing Environmental Tectonics in light of the
Clayco decision).
98. Clayco, 712 F.2d at 406-07. The Ninth Circuit did not directly address all the
factors set forth in the OPEC case. Id. Instead the court weighed certain factors, such
as a sovereign's inherent right to protect its people and public interest in an action,
more heavily than others. Id. The court was especially hesitant to decide the case be-
cause in doing so, the court felt that it would have to examine the motivation behind
the governmental acceptance of a bribe. Id.
99. Id. at 408.
100. See id. (citing OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1360 as holding that commercialism does
not automatically create an exception to the act of state doctrine).
101. Id. at 406-08.
102. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (explaining the Ninth Circuit
interpretation of the act of state doctrine in Clayco).
103. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). In a dispute between two United States corpo-
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trust case involving the fraudulent acquisition of foreign patents, the
court relied upon the flexible approach espoused in the Ninth Circuit's
Timberlane decision." 4 The court held that a foreign sovereign's issu-
ance of patents was not equivalent to the act of state definition that has
evolved since Sabbatino.'0 5 The court, therefore, outlined a series of ten
factors to consider when deciding whether to apply the act of state doc-
trine.' 6 Although Mannington Mills signifies a return to a more flexi-
ble approach,' 0 7 the Third Circuit, by incorporating several distinct
factors into its analysis, still failed to elucidate a clear standard to alle-
viate the confusion and uncertainty associated with the doctrine.
In the more recent Third Circuit case, Williams v. Curtiss-
Wright,10 the court again refused to employ the act of state doctrine in
an antitrust action that involved the monopolization of the international
market for jet engines. 0 9 In affirming the district court decision, the
court rejected an approach that would preclude adjudication in all
cases that involve judicial scrutiny of the motivations behind a foreign
government's military procurement decisions. 110 The court noted that
rations that manufactured floor covering, Mannington Mills claimed that Congolcur
fraudulently acquired rights to foreign patents in violation of United States antitrust
laws. Id. at 1290. Congoleum raised an act of state defense, arguing that a court could
consider the granting of patents the act of a foreign sovereign. Id.
104. Id. at 1292-94; see Bazyler, supra note 4, at 358 (arguing that the Third
Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit's Timberlane decision).
105. Id. at 1293-94.
106. Id. at 1297-98. Building on the factors outlined in Timberlane, the Third Cir-
cuit developed the following factors:
(1) Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy; (2) Nationality of the parties;
(3) Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that
abroad; (4) Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there,
(5) Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeabil-
ity; (6) Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction
and grants relief; (7) If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the
position of being forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be under
conflicting requirements by both countries; (8) Whether the court can make its
order effective; (9) Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this coun-
try if made by the foreign nation under similar circumstances; (10) Whether a
treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
Id.
107. Bazyler, supra note 4, at 358.
108. 694 F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1982). Williams alleged that Curtiss-Wright monopo-
lized the international market for certain jet engines. Id. at 304. Williams claimed
violations of United States antitrust laws and common law tort. Id. at 301-02. Curtiss-
Wright moved to dismiss on act of state grounds, arguing that adjudication would re-
quire an examination of a foreign government's motives in buying jet engines only from
Curtiss-Wright. Id.
109. Id. The Third Circuit denied Curtiss-Wright's motion to dismiss and refused
to employ the act of state doctrine. Id.
110. Id.: see also Environmental Tectonics, 847 F.2d at 1060 (analyzing and dis-
cussing Judge Weis' Third Circuit decision in Curtiss- Wright).
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private litigants are not necessarily immune from antitrust and other
civil suits simply because some part of an illegal scheme happens to
involve the acts of a foreign government."' The court stressed that the
act of state doctrine should not hinder legitimate regulatory goals with-
out a strong showing that adjudication would impact executive branch
involvement in foreign affairs. 12
The definition of the act of state doctrine formulated in both Man-
nington Mills and Curtiss-Wright requires more than mere conjecture
that adjudication may have an adverse effect on the executive branch
foreign relations power." 3 The Third Circuit has thus attempted to cre-
ate a standard applicable in other than expropriation cases, such as in
Environmental Tectonics.
1I. ENVIRONMENTAL TECTONICS CORP. INT'L V. W.S.
KIRKPATRICK & CO., INC.
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In Environmental Tectonics Corp. lt'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.,
Inc.,"' the cause of action arose when the Minister of Defense for the
Federal Republic of Nigeria awarded a defense related contract."' En-
vironmental Tectonics Corp. (ETC), a Pennsylvania corporation,
brought suit against W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. (Kirkpatrick),"'0 a New
Jersey corporation, for violations of the state racketeering laws,' 1 7 the
I ll. See Curtiss- Wright, 694 F.2d at 304 (citing Continental Ore ,. Union Carbide
& Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962)); Environmental Tectonics, 847 F.2d at 1060
(citing Continental Ore and discussing the Curtiss-Wright decision).
112. Curtiss-Wright. 694 F.2d at 304.
113. Id.; Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287. 1293 (3d Cir.
1979).
114. 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988).
115. Brief for Appellant at 3, Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l. v. W.S. Kirk-
patrick & Co., 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988) (No. 87-5328) [hereinafter Brief for
Appellant]. The Minister of Defense awarded the contract for the design and construc-
tion of an aeromedical facility at the Kaduna Air Force Base in Nigeria to Kirkpat-
rick's international subsidiary. Id.
116. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 659 F. Supp.
1381 (D.N.J. 1987). The ETC brought suits against Kirkpatrick's holding company, its
international subsidiary, corporate officers, and corporate subcontractors. Brief for Ap-
pellant, supra note 115, at 5.
117. New Jersey Anti-Racketeering Act. N.J. STAT. A%%. § 2C:41-2 (West 1982).
The statute provides:
A. It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived.
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collec-
tion of an unlawful debt in which he has participated as a principal %ithin the
meaning of N.J.S. 2C:2-6 to use or invest, directly and indirectly. an) part of the
income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of any
enterprise which is engaged in or the activities of w'hich affect trade or
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federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)," 8 and the Robinson-Patman Act." 9 ETC claimed that Kirk-
patrick and other defendants participated in a scheme to bribe Niger-
ian government officials, which eventually led to the award of the con-
tract to Kirkpatrick.'
ETC and Kirkpatrick' 2' both sell and distribute aircraft parts and
aero-medical equipment to foreign airforce groups and foreign and do-
mestic airlines. 2 2 In 1980, Kirkpatrick learned of a potential Nigerian
aero-medical supply contract.12 3 Harry Carpenter, Kirkpatrick's Chief
Executive Officer, subsequently employed Benson Akindele, a Nigerian
national, to help acquire the contract.2 4 Akindele informed Carpenter
that Kirkpatrick may be required to pay up to a twenty percent "com-
commerce.
Id.
118. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 84 Stat. 941, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-68 (1982 & West Supp. 1989). Section 1961 defines the activities that are
considered criminal violations of the RICO statute, including arson, bribery and mail,
wire, and securities fraud. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-62 (1982 & West Supp. 1989).
The statute, section 1962(b) to (d) also provides:
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indi-
rectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. (c) It shall be unlawful
for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or partici-
pate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of debt. (d) It shall be unlawful for
any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or
(c) of this section.
Id.
119. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982). This section makes it un-
lawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay, grant, receive, or accept payment
of commissions or other compensation that is not rendered in connection with the sale
or purchase of goods or services. Id.
120. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 847 F.2d
1052, 1054 (3d Cir. 1988); Brief for Appellant, supra note 115, at 5-7. Kirkpatrick and
its chairman, Harry Carpenter, were each convicted of violating the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. Kirkpatrick was fined $75,000 and Carpenter was fined $10,000 and
ordered to perform 200 hours of community service. Id. at 13; see also Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1982 & West Supp. 1989) (outlining provisions of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act under which Kirkpatrick and Carpenter were
convicted).
121. Brief for Appellant, supra note 115, at 5.
122. Environmental Tectonics, 847 F.2d at 1054-55; Brief for Appellant, supra
note 115, at 6-7.
123. Brief for Appellant, supra note 115, at 6-7.
124. Id. At this time, Kirkpatrick lacked the ability to complete the entire contract
on its own. Id. Kirkpatrick began negotiations with subcontractors to prepare for the
acquisition of the contract. Id. In addition to the subcontractors, Carpenter hired
Akindele to pose as a local agent to acquire the contract. Id.
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mission" to guarantee the award. 2 , Kirkpatrick then entered into a
written agreement with Akindele that outlined the commission pay-
ment schedule based on the previously negotiated Nigerian contract
126,prices.
Throughout 1981, ETC prepared a bid for the Nigerian contract,
continuously submitting pricing data to the Nigerian government and
meeting directly with Nigerian government officials to negotiate details
of the contract.1 27 ETC submitted its final bid for the project in Febru-
ary 1982.128 Despite ETC's efforts, on March 19, 1982, the Nigerian
Ministry of Defense awarded the contract to Kirkpatrick.129 In 1983,
after discovering that its bid for the Nigerian contract was significantly
lower than Kirkpatrick's, ETC investigated the award and subsequently
filed suit.130
Kirkpatrick raised the act of state doctrine as a defense and moved
for dismissal of the case.13' In 1987, the United States District Court
125. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.. 847 F.2d
1052, 1055 (3d Cir. 1988); Brief for Appellant, supra note 115, at 7-10. During meet-
ings with Kirkpatrick and the subcontractors, Akindele reviewed the requirement of a
20% commission. Id. He stated that European competitors customarily made such
commission payments and often outbid the United States competitors. Id. Akindele
allegedly broke down the commission payments as follows: 2.5% for Akindele, 5% for
the Nigerian Air Force, 2.5% for the medical group. 5% for a political party. 2.5%
for a cabinet minister, plus 2.5% for other key defense personnel. Id. at 10 n.3.
126. Id. at 7-10. Kirkpatrick agreed to pay the commissions to tmo separate Pana-
manian corporations that Akindele created and controlled. Id. Akindele then wvas re-
sponsible for distributing the monies to the appropriate people based on the settled
contract price. Id.
127. Environmental Tectonics, 847 F.2d at 1055-56; Brief for Appellant. supra
note 115, at 9-Il.
128. Brief for Appellant, supra note 115, at 9-11.
129. Id. The Nigerian government awarded the contract for aero-medical equip-
ment and construction of an aeromedical facility to Kirkpatrick's DISC corporation for
a total price of S10,800,000.00, including the 20% commission. Id.
130. Id. The investigation revealed that in September 1982, after Nigeria's initial
payment, Kirkpatrick made payments of SI17,929.34 and S 193,657.70 to Akindele
through the two Panamanian corporations and that Akindele subsequently disbursed
the monies according to the payment schedule. Id. As the Nigerian government made
progress payments to Kirkpatrick in December 1982, February 1983, and August 1983.
Kirkpatrick similarly paid $1,764,019.58 (20% of the contract price) to Akindele and
Nigerian government officials through the Panamanian corporations. Id.: see note 120
(detailing how the United States Department of Justice subsequently became involved
in the investigation and Kirkpatrick and Carpenter later pled guilty to violations of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
131. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.. 659 F. Supp.
1381, 1391-92 (D.N.J. 1987). Kirkpatrick argued that in order to prove violations of
RICO and the Robinson-Patman Act, ETC must first establish that the Nigerian gov-
ernment officials knowingly accepted bribes. Id. Kirkpatrick argued that the court must
make a determination about the validity of the acts of Nigeria as a foreign sovereign.
Id.
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for the District of New Jersey dismissed ETC's original suit on these
grounds.132 In reaching its conclusion, the district court relied heavily
on the Bernstein letter'33 and the Ninth Circuit's holding in the Clayco
case. 34 ETC appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit.1
35
B. THE THIRD CIRCUIT DECISION
On appeal, ETC claimed that the lower court erred in dismissing the
case because the act of state doctrine did not apply. 3 ' ETC asserted
that bribery of a few government officials to attain a foreign military
contract is not an act of state. 137 ETC also asserted that the award of a
military procurement contract is commercial in nature, does not require
a determination of the motives of a sovereign state, and, thus, would
not interfere with the executive's role in foreign relations. 3 8
Despite ETC's argument, the Third Circuit agreed with the lower
court that the award of a foreign military procurement contract might
constitute a sufficient expression of an act of state'39 and that the com-
mercial exception only applies when an action is purely commercial in
nature.140 The court, however, did not find enough evidence to other-
132. Environmental Tectonics, 659 F. Supp. at 1391-92. The court also held that
ETC had standing to allege that Kirkpatrick engaged in bribery, mail, and wire fraud
in violation of RICO. Id. at 1389-91. The district court dismissed the allegations be-
cause ETC did not demonstrate a pattern of racketeering. Id. at 1389. The court also
ruled that ETC's amended complaint stated a sufficient claim against Kirkpatrick's
holding company, but that Carpenter could invoke his fifth amendment rights not to
answer certain deposition questions. Id. at 1398-1402.
133. Id. at 1396-98. Judge Lechner requested an opinion on the issue from the
State Department and received an official answer in the form of a Bernstein letter from
Federal Judge Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor to the United States State Depart-
ment. Id. at 1042.
134. Id. at 1392-96; see supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text (detailing the
Clayco case where the act of state doctrine barred adjudication in an international
transaction involving bribery and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
135. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 847 F.2d
1052 (3d Cir. 1988).
136. Id.: Brief for Appellant, supra note 115, at 15.
137. Environmental Tectonics. 847 F.2d at 1058; Brief for Appellant, supra note
115, at 22.
138. Environmental Tectonics. 847 F.2d at 1057.
139. Id. at 1058-59. The court also distinguished between governmental actions
having little impact upon foreign policy and military procurement contracts that gener-
ally involve judicial entanglement with executive branch foreign affairs. Id.
140. Id. at 1059. The court characterized a sovereign's purely commercial activity
not by the purpose of the act, but by its nature. Id. In order to be purely commercial,
the activity must result in individual profit. Id. The court distinguished a military pro-
curement contract, which is generally governmental in nature, from an ordinary con-
tract, that is generally commercial in nature. Id.
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wise substantiate the lower court findings.1 4 Ultimately. the court de-
clined to invoke the act of state doctrine.
4 2
In addition, the Third Circuit rejected the lower court's reliance on
the Ninth Circuit's Clayco decision.'4 3 The lower court attempted to
equate Environmental Tectonics with Cla'yco, 44 but the Third Circuit
court found inconsistencies within the Clayco holding. 4" Although the
Ninth Circuit claimed to espouse a flexible approach to the application
of the act of state doctrine, the Third Circuit characterized it as an
expansive application146 and not in accordance with prior Third Circuit
decisions. 14 7 The Ninth Circuit refused to inquire into a foreign sover-
eign's motivations on the theory that such an inquiry would impinge
upon executive branch foreign relations power.' 48 Instead, the Third
Circuit court applied the standard it first articulated in Mannington
Mills 149 and later affirmed in Curtiss-Wright.' "
141. Id. The court disagreed with the lower court's theory that the act of state
doctrine barred ETC's claims if the judicial determination requires an inquiry into a
sovereign's motivations that could embarrass the sovereign or interfere in the conduct
of United States foreign policy. Id. (citing Environmental Tectruni,s. 659 F. Supp. at
1392-93 (D.N.J. 1987)).
142. Id. at 1062.
143. See supra notes 88-106 and accompanying text (discussing ClaYco and other
Ninth Circuit decisions on the act of state doctrine).
144. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.. 847 F.2d
1052, 1059 (3d Cir. 1988).
145. Id. at 1059-60.
146. See id. at 1060 (defining an expansive interpretation as allotting a court to
invoke the act of state doctrine in any case where it is only necessary to luok at the
motivation behind a foreign sovereign's action).
147. Id. at 1060. The court also notes that the Second Circuit adopted the Clayco
approach to the act of state doctrine in Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp. (citing Hunt 1. MAbil
Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977)). Id. at 1060 n.9. The court noted. however. that
several circuits and commentators have criticized the analysis because it prevents the
extraterritorial enforcement of United States regulatory policies. I
148. Id. at 1060.
149. Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). In
Mannington Mills, the Third Circuit focused not only on the character of foreign sov-
ereign conduct, but also on the problem of allowing United States corporations to hide
their illegal and improper actions behind the act of state doctrine defense. I at 1293-
94; Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.. 847 F. 2d 1052,
1060 (3d Cir. 1988) (discussing the nature of a foreign sovereign's conduct necessary
to constitute an act of state (quoting Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1292-94)).
150. Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1982). The Third
Circuit held that a private party does not enjoy the same immunit" from liabilitN given
to a foreign sovereign if a private party participates in illegal activity that involves a
foreign government or its official actions. Id. at 304 (citing Continental Ore Co. 1.
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962)); Environmtntal Tectonics. 847
F.2d at 1060 (citing the same case and articulating the same proposition). The court
also emphasized the need to guarantee that the act of state doctrine does not obstruct
the enforcement of United States regulatory and trade laws when adjudication would
not interfere with executive branch foreign relation goals. Curtis-Wright. 694 F.2d at
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In Environmental Tectonics, the Third Circuit rejected a speculative
standard of proof, stating that a court should not invoke the act of state
doctrine without demonstrable proof that adjudication of a claim will
interfere with executive branch political and foreign relations pow-
ers.' The Third Circuit dismissed the lower court's speculative stan-
dard because it relied on nothing more than a broad theory that inquiry
into the Nigerian government officials' motivations may possibly have
an effect on United States relations with Nigeria. 1 2 In fact, the only
authoritative source of proof available to determine the impact on for-
eign relations was the Bernstein letter that the lower court received
from the State Department. 
1 3
In its analysis of the Bernstein letter,1 54 the Third Circuit relied
heavily on the State Department's assessment of whether adjudication
would prejudice executive branch foreign relations.'66 The court em-
phasized the State Department's distinction between a judicial inquiry
into the motivation of a foreign sovereign act and questioning the valid-
ity or legality of foreign sovereign actions. 156 The court agreed with the
State Department's view that the act of state doctrine is too expansive
when it simply bars adjudication whenever an examination of a foreign
sovereign's motivations is necessary and such adjudication poses only a
slight threat of interference with executive branch foreign relations
powers. 
15 7
The Third Circuit also based its decision in Environmental Tectonics
on its most recent decision in Curtiss-Wright,' " which employed a sim-
ilar theory. The court found that both cases would involve little more
than an examination of the motives of a foreign sovereign's actions,
304; Environmental Tectonics, 847 F.2d at 1060; see also supra notes 108-12 and ac-
companying text (discussing Curtiss-Wright's attempt to use act of state doctrine in an
antitrust case as a defense).
151. Environmental Tectonics, 847 F.2d at 1061.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Letter from Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor to the United States De-
partment of State, to Judge Lechner, United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey (Dec. 10, 1986) cited in Environmental Tectonics Corp., 847 F.2d at 1068-
69 (App.) (3d Cir. 1988) (discussing the State Department's official pronouncement in
a Bernstein letter that Judge Lechner requested for the Environmental Tectonics
litigation).
155. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 847 F.2d
1052, 1062 (3d Cir. 1988).
156. See id. at 1062 (citing the Bernstein letter from Abraham D. Sofaer to Judge
Lechner (Dec. 10, 1986)).
157. Id.; see supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text (discussing the Clayco
case).
158. Environmental Tectonics, 847 F.2d at 1062.
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rather than a determination of the validity or legality of those ac-
tions.1 59 Neither defendant proved beyond mere speculation that adju-
dication of such claims would result in great interference with the for-
eign affairs power of the executive branch. 160 Therefore, the court did
not invoke the act of state doctrine and remanded the case for a deci-
sion on its merits. 6 1
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE'S ROLE IN OTHER THAN
EXPROPRIATION CASES-A DIFFERENT STANDARD
In Environmental Tectonics, the Third Circuit considered the issues
of Kirkpatrick's bribery of Nigerian government officials to secure a
military procurement contract and Kirkpatrick's subsequent attempt at
a defensive application of the act of state doctrine. 62 The Supreme
Court, however, has traditionally focused on the act of state doctrine in
expropriation cases. 63 In addition, until recently, the Supreme Court
has failed to grant certiorari or decide any act of state cases.'"
The act of state doctrine is a guide for lower courts decisions involv-
ing the definite acts of foreign sovereigns, such as expropriation. 6 5 In
recent years, however, lower court cases have focused more on the doc-
trine as a defense against loss or damage to imperceptible, yet valuable
rights, with the ultimate cause not necessarily the act of a foreign sov-
ereign.' 6 Environmental Tectonics falls into this latter category, mak-
159. Id. The Third Circuit's precedent and current analysis tend to affirm the State
Department's motivation-validity distinction. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1054-55; see supra notes 114-35 and accompanying text (discussing the
factual background of Environmental Tectonics).
163. See supra notes 17-79 and accompanying text (outlining the history of the
Supreme Court treatment of the act of state doctrine).
164. Id.; see supra note 52 (indicating that in 1976 Supreme Court decided its last
major act of state case, Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba).
165. See supra notes 17-79 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court
treatment of the act of state doctrine).
166. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.. 847 F.2d
1052, 1058 (3d Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court has avoided developing rigid rules to
govern the doctrine's application, but has left the lower courts to decide when a partic-
ular case would cause a conflict between the judicial and executive branches. Id. This
allows the lower courts to balance the need to avoid such a conflict against an individ-
ual's right to a day in court. Id. The Supreme Court has left unresolved act of state
determinations on such governmental acts as court decisions, powers over licenses, pat-
ents, construction awards or other types of procurement contracts that could involve
bribery or other anticompetitive actions. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELA-
TIONs LAW supra note 1, at § 443 note 7 (discussing the act of state doctrine in anti-
trust and other nonexpropriation cases).
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ing the Third Circuit decision not only difficult, but crucial because it
attempts to create a standard for implementation of the act of state
doctrine in other than the traditional expropriation cases.
In suits involving the defensive use of the act of state doctrine
against claims of bribery and other regulatory laws, it is often difficult
to determine whether or not foreign sovereign involvement is actually
sovereign in nature.16 7 Even the term act of state only adds confusion to
this determination.168 When considering this ambiguity, some courts in-
voke the act of state doctrine only when involvement is clearly substan-
tial,169 while other courts, unable to determine what is a substantial
degree of involvement, invoke the act of state doctrine to avoid having
to make difficult decisions. 70
One factor most courts consider in rendering a decision is the possi-
bility of interfering with executive branch foreign policy. 171 In antitrust
or bribery situations, however, the dispute is usually between private
parties with only limited foreign sovereign involvement, and, thus, the
court's decision usually has only a slight impact upon foreign rela-
tions. 2 The ultimate question is whether the possibility of a slight im-
pact on foreign relations should be the determinative factor in the deci-
sion to hear such a case on its merits.
167. Compare Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293-
95 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding a foreign sovereign patent issuance is not an act of state)
with Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 407 (9th
Cir. 1983) (holding that a foreign sovereign decision over exploitation and control of
natural resources is an act of state).
168. See Bazyler, supra note 4, at 365-66 n.250 (arguing that a court may consider
virtually any governmental action an act of state). Nearly all international transaction
involves some degree of foreign government involvement because the governments fre-
quently own a large majority of the business and economic enterprises. Id.
169. See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1293-94 (analyzing the nature of conduct
and the effect on the parties); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d
597, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1976) (distinguishing public acts of a foreign sovereign protected
under the act of state from private acts of foreign sovereign that are not protected).
170. See Clayco, 712 F.2d at 407 (determining that the exploitation of control over
natural resources is an act of state); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 78-79 (2d Cir.)
(stating that the act of state doctrine bars examining the motives of a Libyan govern-
ment expropriation of a Hunt concession).
171. See Bazyler, supra note 4, at 367 (stating that the problem with focusing on
interference with executive branch foreign policy decisions is that every court decision
involving an international transaction could potentially interfere in foreign relations or
embarrass the executive branch (citing OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981)).
172. See Comment, Foreign Corrupt Practices, supra note 9, at 210-11 (explaining
the difficulty in ascertaining whether an alleged antitrust violation is an act of state).
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B. THE THIRD CIRCUIT CORRECTLY RELIED UPON THE PRECEDENT
SET IN MANNINGTON MILLS AND CURTISS- WRIGHT
In Mannington Mills, the Third Circuit stated that a court should
not lightly impose the act of state doctrine."' In Environmental Tec-
tonics, the court reasoned that the formulation of the act of state doc-
trine that it created implicitly in Mannington Mills and explicitly in
Curtiss-Wright would not allow a court to invoke the act of state doc-
trine simply because "mere conjecture" exists about the possible ad-
verse effects upon the sensibilities of foreign governments. 174 This is the
proper approach because it considers the impact that adjudication will
have upon foreign affairs, and does not permit dismissal simply based
on a slight possibility of conflict.1"5 The court places the burden upon
the defendant to show that adjudication of the claim poses a "demon-
strable, not speculative threat" to United States foreign relations,
thereby, articulating an appropriate standard of review."7
In applying this standard to the facts in Environmental Tectonics,
the court found the only evidence that ETC's suit may affect relations
between the United States and Nigeria was the Bernstein letter from
the State Department.1 7 7 The court determined that the Department of
State, as a voice of the executive branch, did not believe that inquiry
into the motivations behind the Nigerian government's award of the
contract was an inquiry into the legality or validity of an action.1 78
There was only the possibility of inquiry into the legality of the action
of a foreign sovereign, and this speculation would not compromise
United States foreign relations with Nigeria. 
17
The court's interpretation of the Bernstein letter in this case is inter-
esting. Previous discussions of the Bernstein letter exception' 80 reveal
that the Third Circuit could have chosen to rely more heavily on the
letter to create an exception to the use of the act of state doctrine and,
173. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir.
1979).
174. See Bazyler, supra note 4, at 365-67 (stating that there is a possibility or
foreign governmental involvement in almost every international transaction).
175. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.. 847 F.2d
1052, 1061 (3d Cir. 1988). The court found that the defendant failed to demonstrate
that the litigation would result in the type of institutional conflict that would invoke the
doctrine. Id.
176. Id. The court placed the burden on the defendant to prove that the act of state




180. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text (discussing the Bernstein letter
exception to act of state doctrine).
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consequently, could have decided the case on the merits."8 The court,
however, chose to use the contents of the letter as evidence that not
more than mere speculation of judicial interference in foreign relations
existed, and, thus, a judicial inquiry into the motivation of a foreign
sovereign action did not meet the traditional standard for invoking the
act of state doctrine.182 This decision effectively refutes the standard
established in Clayco.183
The Third Circuit properly distinguished and discredited the stan-
dard that the Ninth Circuit expressed in Clayco'84 that the act of state
doctrine bars adjudication if a claim requires a judicial inquiry into the
motivation of a sovereign act. 85 The Ninth Circuit's expansive applica-
tion of the act of state doctrine essentially makes it so inflexible that
almost any inquiry would either cause embarrassment to the executive
branch or result in interference with United States foreign policy. 8 '
Although the facts in Environmental Tectonics and Clayco are very
similar, 87 the decisions are contradictory.
In Clayco, the Ninth Circuit appears particularly concerned with
preventing interference with executive branch foreign relations powers
and general executive embarrasssment. 88 The court, however, articu-
lates a standard, that effectively creates a shield for United States cor-
porations involved in illegal conduct abroad. 189 The Clayco decision
does little more than dilute the enforcement capability of United States
regulatory laws. 190
181. Id. The Supreme Court has never expressly accepted the Bernstein letter ex-
ception and, thus, courts consider a letter highly persuasive but not dispositive. Id.
182. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.. 847 F.2d
1052, 1058-61 (3d Cir. 1988).
183. Id. at 1061. The court relies on language in the letter from an amicus brief of
the United States. Id. It states as follows:
[T]hat doctrine only precludes judicial questioning of the validity or legality of
foreign governments actions. . . . Judicial inquiry into the purpose of a foreign
sovereign's acts would not require a court to rule on the legality of those acts,
and a finding concerning purpose would not entail the particular kind of harm
that the act of state doctrine is designed to avoid. (emphasis added)
Id.
184. Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th
Cir. 1983).
185. Id.
186. See Bazyler, supra note 4, at 361-67 (discussing the inflexibility of the
doctrine).
187. See supra notes 97-102 & 114-35 and accompanying text (stating facts in
Cla vco and Environmental Tectonics).
188. Clayco, 712 F.2d at 407.
189. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 847 F.2d
1052, 1059-60 (3d Cir. 1988).
190. Id. at 1061-62.
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Conversely, the Third Circuit in Environmental Tectonics is primar-
ily concerned with preventing United States corporations involved in
illegal activities abroad from hiding behind the shield of the act of state
doctrine. 91 The court alleviates that concern by placing the burden of
proof on the moving party to show that the adjudication of the claim
would somehow hinder United States foreign relations."'9 The court ar-
ticulates a workable standard that aids in preserving legitimate federal
regulatory goals.193 The standard allows for a measurable degree of ju-
dicial involvement and places a positive burden on the defendant. The
Environmental Tectonics decision illuminates the scope of the act of
state doctrine in cases involving extraterritorial violation of federal reg-
ulatory laws by providing shape and form to a doctrine that is over-
broad and expansive.
CONCLUSION
The act of state doctrine began as a doctrine of judicial restraint
grounded in the separation of powers theory, but since has evolved, in
some courts, into a complete bar to adjudication. In eases that involve
foreign expropriation such a theory of restraint may be appropriate,
but in international transaction cases that violate federal regulatory
laws with only minimal foreign sovereign involvement, it is inapplica-
ble. In cases involving claims between private parties where the alleged
wrongdoer employs the act of state doctrine as a defense, the doctrine
should not automatically bar adjudication.
In Environmental Tectonics, the Third Circuit correctly placed the
burden upon the defendant to prove that adjudication of the claim
poses a "demonstrable, not speculative threat" to United States foreign
relations.1 9 Though the court does not draw a bright line, it creates a
standard that should help other courts to determine when to invoke the
act of state doctrine in difficult cases. In applying this standard, courts
can reach a fair and just determination and clearly demonstrate how
they reached that decision.
POSTSCRIPT
On October 31, 1988, the Supreme Court requested the Solicitor




194. Id. at 1061.
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ment on the act of state doctrine in Environmental Tectonics.19 After
receipt and review of this brief, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Environmental Tectonics.9" Only one question now remains un-
resolved: whether the Supreme Court feels ready to affirm the Third
Circuit decision and articulate a clear standard for implementation of
the act of state doctrine in other than foreign expropriation cases.'
195. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l. 109 S.Ct.
301, 57 U.S.L.W. 3312 (Oct. 31, 1988).
196. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 109 S.Ct.
3213, 57 U.S.L.W. 3841 (June 26, 1989). Review is limited to the act of state doctrine
issue. Id.
As of this date, petitioner, Kirkpatrick, amicus, Solicitor General, and amicus, Re-
public of China have filed briefs in the case which is scheduled for hearing during the
October 1989 term.
197. See supra notes 136-61 and accompanying text (revealing the Third Circuit
standard that in private causes of action for violations of federal regulatory laws, the
act of state doctrine cannot be invoked without demonstrable proof that an inquiry into
the motivations of a foreign sovereign will threaten executive branch foreign relations
powers).
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